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JUST SAY YES TO DRUG-TESTING LEGISLATION: THE
SKINNER AND VON RAAB DECISIONS
INTRODUCTION
Drug abuse has reached its tentacles into middle America ....
...The costs of drug abuse to our society include the unmeasurable
[sic] effects of disregard for the law, corruption of public officials, loss
of confidence in government, high crime rates, undermined military pre-
paredness, family and community disruption, threats to national and public
security, and the pain and suffering of countless individuals.'
The "drug-effect" in America, as depicted above, is an undeniable reality.
This reality is reflected in statistics. Annual losses of productivity and medical
expenses are estimated between $33 and $100 billion in the United States.'
It is further estimated that between three and seven percent of American
workers use illicit drugs on a regular basis,3 and, alarmingly, that sixty-five
percent of young adults entering the work force have experimented with
illicit substances. 4 Statistical support is also found in on-the-job performance,
1. President's Comm'n on Organized Crime: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 99, 112 (1984) (statement of Francis M. Mullen, Jr., Administrator, Drug
Enforcement Admin.). The seriousness of the drug problem, and the concurrent need for
combative measures, is further emphasized in Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug
Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987). Wisotsky notes extensive
measures taken by social forces which highlight the drug abuse problem. The article recognizes
measures taken by numerous parent groups and the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA").
It notes the DEA hired hundreds of drug agents, placed the FBI in charge of the DEA,
established the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, utilized the CIA for intelligence
information about coca and marijuana crops under cultivation, employed armed forces in drug
enforcement operations, and even pressured foreign governments to eradicate illegal drug crops.
Id. at 891-93.
2. 5 T. DENENBERG & R. DENENBERG, ALCOHOL AND DRUGS: ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE
(1983); Comment, Use and Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in the Workplace: A Proposal for
Federal Legislation Limiting Drug Screening, 35 EMORY L.J. 1011 (1986).
3. Effect of Alcohol and Drug Abuse on Productivity: Joint Hearing Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse and the Senate Subcomm. on Employment and
Productivity, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 15 (1982) (statement of William Mayer, M.D., Admin-
istrator, U.S. Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Admin.); Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing
and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward a General Rule of Legality Under the
Fourth Amendment, 48 U. PITT. L. Rev. 201, 203 (1986).
4. OSHA Oversight Hearing on the Impact of Alcohol and Drug Abuse on Worker Health
and Safety: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and Safety of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-28 (1985) (statement of Elaine Johnson, Acting
Deputy Director, National Institute on Drug Abuse, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services);
Lewis, Drug Testing in the Workplace: Legal and Policy Implications for Employers and
Employees, 1987 DET. C.L. REV. 699, 701 (1987).
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where drug and alcohol abusers are three times more likely to be injured
than non-abusers,5 are one-third less productive, 6 suffer four times more
work-related accidents 7 and file compensation claims at a five times higher
rate.' These statistics, combined with glaring publicity9 and public outcry,
have served as the catalyst for combative measures in both the public and
private sectors. Indicative of these retaliatory measures is the institution of
urinalysis testing by more than twenty-five percent of the Fortune 500
companies, 10 the issuance of an Executive Order for a "Drug-Free Federal
Work Place" " and the establishment of drug-testing programs in the Customs
Service and the railroad industry.
While the goals of eliminating illegal drug use and its associated problems
are laudable ends, the means used to attain these ends must be examined.
The destructive effect of drugs is apparent, 2 and the need to combat this
destruction is equally urgent. However, "[in order to win the war against
drugs, we must not sacrifice the life of the Constitution in the battle."' 3
Drug testing, and specifically urinalysis testing, raises constitutional issues
on many levels,' 4 and especially brings into focus the fourth amendment's
requirement that government searches and seizures are reasonable.
This Comment will focus on the fourth amendment dilemma presented by
drug testing, beginning with a brief overview of fourth amendment search
and seizure law.' 5 The overview will place special emphasis on the reasona-
5. Lewis, supra note 4, at 702.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Lewis, supra note 4, at 700 n.l.
10. McGovern, Employee Drug-Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War
on Drugs, 39 STAN. L.. REV. 1453, 1453 n.1 (1987); Miller, supra note 3, at 202.
11. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986). The impact of the Executive Order
has been manifested in both the institution of drug-testing programs and in litigation challenging
the constitutionality of these testing programs. Unfortunately, the scope of this Comment allows
only minimal attention to the Order. For a more extensive analysis, see Note, The Drug-Free
Federal Workplace: A Question of Reasonableness, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215, 242-48
(1987).
12. See supra notes 2-8.
13. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986).
14. Drug-testing programs are challenged on a number of constitutional provisions, including
the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the fifth amend-
ment's safeguard prohibiting self-incrimination, the fifth and fourteenth amendments' guar-
antees of due process and equal protection, and the constitutional protection of the penumbral
rights of privacy. See infra notes 61-139 and accompanying text (exploring fourth, fifth and
fourteenth amendment constitutional challenges).
15. This Comment does not present itself as an exhaustive study of fourth amendment
search and seizure law. For a more comprehensive examination of the fourth amendment and
its development, see J. HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS (1979); W. LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937);
B. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT; A JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY (1986).
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bleness requirement of the fourth amendment and its crucial role in the
drug-testing arena. Next, the Comment will examine the recent Supreme
Court opinions in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association16 and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab"7 and the high court's
application of the "special needs" exception to the fourth amendment in
these cases. Finally, the Comment will discuss the impact of the Supreme
Court's decisions, and then propose national legislation to govern urinalysis
drug testing.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
"[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized,'8
This constitutional provision has become the focal point of both the pro-
motions of, and challenges to, urinalysis drug testing. 9 However, it is
important to note the limited circumstances20 which receive the fourth amend-
ment's protection. Specifically, the fourth amendment applies only when
governmental action 2' results in an unreasonable search or seizure.12 If there
16. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (reported below sub nom. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v.
Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988)). In 1989, Samuel Skinner replaced James Burnley as
the Secretary of Transportation.
17. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. The framers of the Bill of Rights undoubtedly did not envision the application of fourth
amendment protection to urinalysis drug-testing. Instead, the fourth amendment was largely a
result of American pre-revolutionary struggles with England, and the use of general warrants
and writs of assistance. Bookspan, Behind Open Doors: Constitutional Implications of Gov-
ernment Employee Drug Testing, 11 NOVA L.J. 307, 321 (1987); Note, Good Faith, Reasona-
bleness, and the Lesson of Maryland v. Garrison: Know Thy Neighbor, 38 DE PAUL L. REV.
517, 519-20 (1989).
20. The determination of these limited circumstances is crucial, for if an activity is deter-
mined not to be a search or seizure, the government may have an unfettered right to carry out
that activity. Specifically, the activity is "excluded from judicial control and the command of
reasonableness." Horton v. Goose Creek Ind. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-15 (1984) (actions of DEA agent
constituted government action); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (government action
in state criminal law enforcement officer obtaining evidence); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 487-90 (1971) (petitioner's wife not acting as instrument or agent of state in offering
police petitioner's clothing and guns); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (documents
procured by private individuals, and subsequently transferred to Assistant Attorney General,
not entitled to fourth amendment protection).
22. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, Council 33 v. Meese, 688 F. Supp.
547 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
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is a lack of government action, or no search or seizure, there is no fourth
amendment problem. In addition, "reasonable" governmental searches do
not violate the fourth amendment. These three factors form the basis of any
fourth amendment analysis.
1. The Governmental Action Requirement"
The first prerequisite for fourth amendment application is the govern-
mental action requirement. This requirement stems from the function of the
fourth amendment, 24 which is to prevent the government state and "all of
its creatures" from infringing on the privacy and dignity of individuals.25
Expressed in this function is the "state-actor" requirement, and the reality
that actions of private citizens, acting on their own initiative, fall outside
the purview of the fourth amendment. 26 To determine the existence or absence
of state action, the court must question whether the actor, in light of all the
circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having acted as an "instru-
ment" or agent of the state. 27 A failure to meet this state actor requirement
precludes consideration of the search and seizure and reasonableness factors,
and effectively precludes fourth amendment application.
2. The Search or Seizure Requirement
The next prerequisite for fourth amendment application is the existence
of a search or seizure. For a proper understanding of fourth amendment
law, it is essential to realize that the words "searches and seizures" are
terms of limitation. 21 Specifically, a state action not classified as a search or
seizure escapes the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment.
23. This requirement is afforded only cursory treatment in many of the drug cases and in
this Comment. This minimal attention is warranted by the obvious government action in the
subject cases which involve testing by government agencies.
24. The fourth amendment is binding on the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949)).
25. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (protection of the individual against
official intrusions based on a balancing of needs); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335
(1985) (fourth amendment applies to the actions of many civil and criminal authorities); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (fundamental purpose of the fourth amendment
is to safeguard individual privacy); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (a blood
test invokes fourth amendment issues); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (act of
a private individual does not involve the fourth amendment); see sources cited supra note 19
(discussing the framer's concerns over privacy invasion).
26. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971). The fourth amendment offers
protection from arbitrary government overreaching, and is accordingly implicated only in
instances of government action: However, the policy underlying the fourth amendment is in no
way intended to discourage citizens from aiding in the apprehension of criminals. Id. at 488.
27. Id. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
28. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 356 (1974);
Note, supra note 19, at 521.
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This "search or seizure" determination, therefore, is of utmost significance.
A "seizure" 2 9 of property is deemed to occur when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property. 30 A
"search" occurs3' "when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to consider reasonable is infringed. '32
One of the more significant opinions addressing "search" law is Katz v.
United States.33 In Katz, the Supreme Court dismissed the notion that there
existed "constitutionally protected areas," and instead emphasized that the
fourth amendment protected people, not simply areas. This ruling effectively
terminated the trespass doctrine, which dictated that a search occurred only
if the government invaded a property interest of the defendant. 34
The petitioner in Katz violated a federal statute by transmitting wagering
information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami. 3 At trial, the gov-
ernment was permitted to introduce evidence of the petitioner's end of
telephone conversations.3 6 The government obtained this evidence by attach-
ing an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a public
telephone booth.3 7 The Supreme Court reversed petitioner's conviction. 38 The
Court reasoned that the fourth amendment served to protect people, not
places, and material knowingly exposed to the public was not a subject of
29. This Comment's attention to "seizure" analysis is minimal, as the drug-testing issue is
almost exclusively viewed from the "search" angle. The Court noted this fact in Skinner, and
listed various federal courts of appeals cases finding urine testing to be a search. 109 S. Ct.
1402, 1413 (1989). The Court further noted in dicta that while taking a urine sample might
also be viewed as a fourth amendment seizure, such a characterization was unnecessary, because
the same privacy expectations would be considered in labeling the action a search. Id. at 1413
n.4.
30. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); see also United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 716 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgement) (taking of luggage by narcotics
agents in airport deemed seizure); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747-48 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (police officer's securing of drug balloon after detected in car by flashlight held as
seizure).
31. For instances of governmental action qualifying as a nonsearch, see for example, United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (canine sniff of luggage not a search); United States
v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1978) (use of spotlight to examine a ship on "high seas" does not
constitute search); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (fourth amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches is not extended to "open fields").
32. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113; Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-41
(1979)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
33. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961) (evidence obtained
by attaching listening device to heating duct excluded); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 465 (1928) (tap on telephone wires not search because wires were not part of defendant's
property).
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 359.
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fourth amendment protection. However, the Court recognized that material
an individual sought to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, might be entitled to constitutional protection. 9
While the majority's reasoning carried significant fourth amendment im-
plications, it was the concurrence of Justice Harlan 40 which has since served
as the benchmark for search consideration. Specifically, Justice Harlan set
forth a two part test for determining protected "places." First, a protected
place was one in which an individual exhibited an actual, or subjective,
expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation must be one which society
objectively would consider "reasonable. ' '4t It is the second, objective prong
of this test which case law has utilized, 42 because the judiciary determined
the first prong was too burdensome and inconsistent . 4
As discussed above, the general analysis for "search" consideration was
provided by Katz. However, it was the Schmerber v. California" Court, and
its holding that blood sampling constituted a search, that provides a more
specific analogy for determining whether urinalysis testing involves a search.
In Schmerber, a police officer, after smelling liquor on petitioner's breath
following his involvement in an automobile accident, directed a physician to
take a blood sample from petitioner. 5 A chemical analysis indicating intox-
ication was admitted into evidence and was subsequently objected to as being
a fruit of an unreasonable search. 46 The Court held that the extraction of
blood was plainly within the constraints of the fourth amendment, as "such
testing procedures plainly constitute searches of 'persons' .... ,41
Courts reviewing the constitutionality of urinalysis drug testing have ap-
plied the Schmerber rationale in finding a search .4 The United States District
Court of New Jersey, in Capua v. City of Plainfield,49 analogized blood
taking to urinalysis testing and adopted the Schmerber rationale. Specifically,
the court noted both blood and urine could be medically analyzed to discover
39. Id. at 351-52,
40. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 361.
42. See cases cited supra note 32 and accompanying text,
43. See United States v. White, 407 U.S. 745 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (subjective
expectations are based on laws and customs, which are objective). But see LaFave, The Fourth
Amendment Today: A Bicentennial Appraisal, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1061, 1080 (1987) (requiring
an individual to expect privacy from any and all observation in order to make an expectation
of privacy reasonable is inconsistent with Katz).
44. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
45. Id. at 758.
46. Id. at 759.
47. Id. at 767.
48. E.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987); Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp.
482, 488-89 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
49. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986). In Capua, city firefighters and police department
employees challenged mass urine testing. Accord Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1218.
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numerous physiological facts about an individual.5 0 The court emphasized
that these physiological facts included, but were not limited to, recent
ingestion of alcohol or drugs." The court further reasoned that an individual
does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making
it available for others to collect, 2 and, as with blood, has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his bodily fluids." Hence, the court held that
urinalysis testing, just as blood sampling, constituted a search.
Though there exists a near consensus that urinalysis is a search,54 the
Schmerber rationale is not the sole justification offered by the courts."
Courts5 6 have also explicitly held the disclosure of other "physiological
secrets" implicates the fourth amendment,5 7 while other jurisdictions, on the
weight of precedent, have simply adopted the same "search" holding without
independent analysis. 8 Finally, various tribunals, and defendants, merely
assumed the existence of a search and eschewed analysis. 9
Hence, regardless of the rationale adopted, the search or seizure require-
ment, though a major factor in fourth amendment analysis, has had only a
minor impact in the urinalysis-testing arena. Instead, it is the reasonableness
requirement imposed by the fourth amendment which is the focus of most
analyses .60
50. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513.
51. Id. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, Council 33 v. Meese, 688 F.
Supp. 547, 552 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (laboratory analysis may also reveal whether an individual
suffers from diabetes, whether an individual is taking medication for epilepsy or depression,
or whether a female is pregnant).
52. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513, (quoting McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127
(D. Iowa 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987)).
53. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513.
54. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413 n.4 (1989) (listing
cases that find that urinalysis is a search). But cf. Everett v. Napper, 632 F. Supp. 1481, 1484
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (no search occurred and therefore no fourth amendment violation when
employee refused to submit to urinalysis test), rev'd in part on other grounds, 833 F.2d 1507
(lth Cir. 1987).
55. See Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 584 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (offering
numerous justifications for finding urinalysis testing a search and citing substantial precedent).
56. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987)
(urinalysis testing may disclose whether an employee is under treatment for epilepsy or depres-
sion, suffering from diabetes, or pregnant), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); McDonell v. Hunter,
809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987) (testing can reveal numerous physiological facts) (quoting
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986)); Bostic v. McClendon,
650 F. Supp. 245, 249 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (reveals numerous physiological facts, including but
not limited to ingestion of alcohol or drugs) (quoting McDonnell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127).
57. E.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, Council 33 v. Meese, 688 F.
Supp. 547, 552 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513.
58. E.g., National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986); Railway Labor Executive's Ass'n
v. Long Island R.R., 651 F. Supp. 1284, 1285-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Pella v. Adams, 638 F.
Supp. 94, 98 (D. Nev. 1986).
59. E.g. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
986 (1986); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
60. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 39:161
3. The Reasonableness Requirement
Finding a search merely begins the court's fourth amendment inquiry into
urinalysis testing. 6' Next, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to determine
whether the reasonableness dictates of the fourth amendment are satisfied. 62
It is a general rule that warrantless searches, such as the urinalysis testing
discussed in this Comment, are per se unreasonable and therefore violative
of the fourth amendment. 63 This per se disposition promotes the desire to
have inferences of probable cause drawn by a "neutral and detached mag-
istrate." 6 Nonetheless, the warrant requirement is not irreducible, 65 and well-
delineated exceptions have been forged. 66
In laymen's terms, these exceptions permit the state to prove the reason-
ableness of a search or seizure without showing probable cause or obtaining
a warrant. Instead, to determine a search's reasonableness or lack thereof,
courts apply a balancing test in which they weigh the need for a particular
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. 67 This
balancing, however, is fraught with complexity, and is not capable of routine,
consistent application. 68 In applying the balancing test, the courts consider
the "scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted,
the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. '69
61. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
62. Id.
63. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Allen v. City of Marietta,
601 F. Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
64. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
65. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.
Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
66. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ga. 1985). For examples of
exceptions to the warrant requirement, see New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (admin-
istrative searches of closely regulated industries); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531 (1985) (border searches); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (searches of
schoolchildren's possessions at school); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (inventory
searches); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (consent); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot
pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (the "automobile exception"); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (search incident to lawful arrest).
67. E.g., Ortega v. O'Connor, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987); United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 703 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Martinez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507,
1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
68. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
69. Id. at 559; see, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (justification of
public safety); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (justification of controlling
entrance of contraband over border); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)
(conducting border searches in a random manner violated the fourth amendment); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (limited police stops justified by exigencies of situation); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (even though place was a public phone booth, there was an
expectation of privacy); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (state interest and manner
of testing justified warrantless blood testing).
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This variety of factors prevents a steadfast approach, and consequently, the
reasonableness question becomes a case-by-case exercise.70
This case-by-case analysis has resulted in numerous fourth amendment
approaches and a variety of exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant
and probable cause requirements. A most significant exception in the drug-
testing context is the "special needs" exception. 7 This exception recognizes
that there often exist "special needs" which make the warrant and probable
cause requirements impracticable.7 2 Recognizing this impracticability, a court
overlooks the fourth amendment requirements of a warrant or probable
cause, and instead applies a balancing test to determine a search's reasona-
bleness. This exception is demonstrated in the New Jersey v. T.L.O. 73 decision.
In T.L.O., a public school official searched a student's purse after learning
that she was smoking in the school lavatory. Upon finding cigarettes in the
purse, the official also noticed cigarette rolling papers. This discovery prompted
a more thorough search, and revealed a small quantity of marijuana, a pipe
and numerous articles indicating the student was selling marijuana. 7 On the
basis of this evidence, and a subsequent confession, the state brought delin-
quency charges against the student. The student argued the official's search
violated the fourth amendment and moved to suppress the evidence. 75 It was
this fourth amendment issue which eventually reached the Supreme Court. 76
The Court, in considering the student's fourth amendment challenge, first held
that searches conducted by public school officials were subject to the restraints
of the fourth amendment. 77 Next, the Court inquired into the reasonableness of
the search, balancing the student's legitimate expectations of privacy against the
interest of maintaining an orderly classroom environment. 71 In employing this
balancing test, Justice White discounted the need for a search warrant 79 or
70. In. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 177-80 (5th Cir.
1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), the court suggested a list of
determinative factors, including the scope and manner of the test, the justification for the test,
the location of the test, voluntary nature considerations, the existing employment relationship,
the possible administrative nature of a search, the availability of less intrusive measures, and
the effectiveness of the administered test. Id.
71. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3168 (1987).
72. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
73. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
74. Id. at 328.
75. Id. at 329.
76. The Court originally granted certiorari on the issue of whether the exclusionary rule
should bar admission into evidence in a juvenile delinquency proceeding of unlawfully seized
information. 464 U.S. 991 (1983). The Court later changed its consideration to the broader
issue of the scope of the fourth amendment with regards to school searches. 469 U.S. at 332.
77. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333.
78. Id. at 339. Justice White noted the growing disorder in school rooms, and specifically
mentioned the growth of drug use and violent crime in the schools. Id.
79. Id. at 340. The Court reasoned that the warrant requirement was particularly unsuited
to the school environment, as requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant would unduly interfere
with swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.
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probable cause,1° and instead held that the legality of the search was a question
of its reasonableness considering all the circumstancesA' The Court held that
both the search for the cigarettes and the search for the marijuana were reason-
able.12 In upholding the cigarette search, the Court reasoned that a teacher's
report of the student's smoking made relevant the issue of whether the student
was carrying cigarettes. 3 This relevancy, the Court opined, served as the "nexus"
between the item searched for and the violation under investigation." Finally,
the Court held the marijuana search was reasonable in light of the suspicion
provided by the rolling papers.
The "special needs" analysis, though not expressly forwarded in the
plurality opinion, was emphasized in the concurrence of Justice Blackmun. 85
The concurrence stated that only when "special needs," beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for
that of the Framers." 8 These "special needs," Justice Blackmun argued,
were inherent in the secondary school setting, because maintaining order was
often difficult and the need for immediate response "was urgent. Finally, the
Court held this need for immediate response, and the potential harm to
school children or the educational process itself in the absence of it, justified
exception from the warrant and probable cause requirements. 7
The "special needs" exception is further demonstrated in Griffin v. Wis-
consin.88 In Griffin, a probation officer, without a warrant, searched a
probationer's home and uncovered a handgun. The search was conducted
pursuant to a state statute which permitted warrantless searches of a pro-
bationer's home if there existed "reasonable grounds" to believe that con-
traband was present.8 9 The purported "reasonable grounds" in Griffin were
supplied by a detective's suggestion that the probationer's domicile contained
firearms.90
In holding the search reasonable, the Court first noted that a state's
operation of a probation system presented a "special need," outside normal
law enforcement, that allowed departure from the usual warrant and probable
cause requirements. 9' In justifying this departure, the Court noted a warrant
80. Id. Justice White noted probable cause was not an irreducible requirement for a
reasonable search.
81. Id. at 341.
82. Id. at 347.
83. Id. at 346.
84. Id. at 345.
85. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 353.
88. 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987).
89. Id. at 3166. For the state regulation, see Wis. ADMIN. CODE § HHS 328 (1987).
90. 107 S. Ct. at 3166.
91. Id. at 3168. The Court also noted that this departure, and its concurrent increase in
supervision, reduced recidivism. Id.
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requirement would decrease the deterrent effect of expeditious searches.
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that a probable cause standard would also
decrease a program's deterrence. 9 Specifically, the Court reasoned that the
implementation of a probable cause standard would allow a probationer to
continue his illegal activities as long as they were sufficiently concealed as
to give rise to no more than a reasonable suspicion. 93
An early drug-testing opinion, 94 though not employing the "special needs"
exception, also demonstrates the balancing often found in fourth amendment
analysis. In Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, the Seventh Circuit upheld
a program requiring bus drivers to submit to blood or urine tests following
their involvement in a serious accident. 9 To determine the program's rea-
sonableness, the court balanced the claims of the public against the interests
of the individual bus driver. 96 In particular, the court noted that the state
actor 97 possessed a paramount interest in protecting the public, and therefore
ruled that the plaintiffs demonstrated no reasonable expectation of privacy. 98
Furthermore, the court held the program's requirement that the employee
be suspected of "being under the influence" by two supervisory employees
contributed to its reasonableness. 99
Cases outside the drug-testing spectrum also demonstrate the balancing
often inherent in analysis of the fourth amendment's reasonableness require-
ment. Specifically, the Supreme Court, in O'Connor v. Ortega,00 focused
on the government employer/employee relationship and its effect on a
search's reasonableness. 0' In O'Connor, the respondent, a state employee
92. Id. at 3170.
93. Id.
94. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
95. Id. at 1267.
96. Id.
97. A majority of the cases discussed in this Comment, including the subject opinions, deal
with public employees. Hence, the attention afforded private sector drug-testing programs and
private employees is slight. It is important to note, however, that the private sector's programs
fall outside the purview of the fourth amendment, and are thereby not governed by its
limitations. This reality is dictated by the fact that a private sector program in no way involves
state action. Nonetheless, it is likely that the Supreme Court's instant opinions will have a
major effect on these programs. For a more in-depth analysis of drug-testing in the private
sector, see Lewis, supra note 4; .Note, Employee Drug Testing-Issues Facing Private Sector
Employers, 65 N.C.L. REV. 832 (1987).
98. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267.
99. Id. This limitation is the requirement of reasonable, individualized suspicion. See also
McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308-09 (8th Cir. 1987) (urinalysis testing in prison
warranted by reasonable suspicion); Guiney v. Roache, 686 F. Supp. 956, 959 (D. Mass. 1988)
(testing of police based on individual suspicion), vacated, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1989); Egloff
v. New Jersey Nat'l Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275, 1280 (D.N.J. 1988) (reasonable suspicion
required to test National Guard employees). But see Amalgamated Transit Union v. Cambria
County Transit Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898, 902 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (no individualized suspicion
necessary to test transportation employees).
100. 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
101. Id. at 1495-96.
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responsible for training physicians in a psychiatric residency program, was
placed on administrative leave pending investigation of alleged improprie-
ties.102 During this leave, hospital officials searched respondent's office,
including his desk and file cabinets, and secured property leading to his
discharge. 10 3 Subsequently, respondent challenged the officials' actions as
being an unreasonable search in violation of the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court summarily rejected a contention that public employees
were precluded from any reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of
work,' 4 and, instead, asserted this expectation of privacy must be determined
on a case-by-case basis. In O'Connor, the Court held a search occurred,
reasoning respondent's reasonable expectation of privacy in his office was
violated. The Court next articulated a reasonableness standard for determin-
ing the constitutionality of the search. Specifically, the court required a
balancing of the invasion of the employee's legitimate expectations of privacy
against the government's need for supervision, control, and the efficient
operation of the work place.0 5 The Court remanded the case with instructions
to apply this reasonableness standard in determining the constitutionality of
the search. Nonetheless, the opinion is still significant for its utilization of
a balancing test and its recognition that a search of a government employee's
office may be reasonable both without a warrant and without probable
cause. 106
The underpinnings and rationale of the administrative search exception0 7
have also influenced the reasonableness of urinalysis drug-testing programs. 18
In Shoemaker v. Handel, "' 9 jockeys brought suit challenging state regulations
which permitted a State Racing Steward to direct any official, jockey, trainer,
or groom to submit to breathalyzer and urine testing. 11 The Steward chose
jockeys for post-race urine tests through random selection, the process being
controlled by numerous procedural safeguards."' In addressing the jockeys'
fourth amendment challenge, the court held a requirement of individualized
suspicion was unnecessary for a valid search. The court noted the exception
102. Id. at 1496.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1498.
105. Id. at 1499.
106. It is important to note this reduction applies only to searches for non-investigatory,
work-related purposes, and investigations of work-related misconduct. Id. at 1502-03.
107. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-05 (1981) (coal mines); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (highway license checks); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (liquor industry); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) (health inspection of residential buildings).
108. E.g., Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988); Shoemaker
v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986); Guiney v. Roache, 686
F. Supp. 956 (D. Mass. 1988), vacated, 873 F.2d 1557 (lst Cir. 1989).
109. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
110. Id. at 1138 nn.1-2.
111. In particular, jockeys are allowed to disclose valid prescription medicine on a certified
form and test results are strictly confidential. Id. at 1140.
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to the warrant requirement in closely regulated industries," 2 and held this
administrative search exception extended to the warrantless testing of persons
engaged in the regulated activity.' 3 In making this determination, the court
emphasized the state interest in the integrity of the individuals in the horse
racing industry."14 Furthermore, the court noted the state had historically
exercised its rule making authority, and thereby reduced justifiable expec-
tations of privacy." 5
The lack of a reasonable, individualized suspicion weighed heavily in the
court's balancing in Capua v. City of Plainfield'1 6 and effectively undermined
the constitutionality of a urinalysis-testing program. Absent any provision
in their collective bargaining agreement, or any prior notification, the fire-
fighters of the City of Plainfield were required to submit to compulsory
urine testing."17 The firefighters challenged the testing as violative of the
fourth amendment, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief."' The court
conceded a search occurred, and then, to determine the search's reasonable-
ness, weighed the intrusion of the compulsory urine testing against the
governmental interest in combating drug abuse." 9
The court emphasized the traditionally private nature of passing urine,
and further noted the unrelated medical information which the testing di-
vulged. The court further reasoned that the lack of testing provisions in
either the collective bargaining agreement or a policy statement heightened
the intrusiveness of the search. 20 Against these intrusive traits, the court
weighed the city's interest in protecting the welfare and public safety of the
citizenry.' 2' The court held the intrusions were more significant, as the lack
of any specific, individual suspicion allowed the program to function in an
uncontrolled, sweeping manner. The court reasoned that, "[tihe invidious
effect of such mass, roundup urinalysis is that it casually sweeps up the
innocent with the guilty and willingly sacrifices each individual's Fourth
Amendment rights in the name of some larger public interest.' 22
112. See cases cited supra note 107.
113. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
117. Id. at 1511-12.
118. Id. at 1512.
119. Id. at 1514.
120. Id. at 1515.
121. Id. at 1515-16.
122. Id. at 1517. For additional cases finding searches of public employees invalid due to
the lack of an individualized suspicion, see Lovelorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539
(6th Cir. 1988); Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); Policemen's
Benevolent Ass'n of New Jersey, Local 318 v. Township of Washington, 672 F.Supp. 779
(D.N.J. 1987), rev'd, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988); Amalgamated Trans. Union, 1227 v. Sunline
Tran. Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F.
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As suggested above, the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amend-
ment is often the determinative factor in assessing the constitutionality of a
drug-testing program. This reality increases the complexity of drug-testing
analysis, and prevents the fourth amendment issues from being framed in
easy and mechanical rules. Instead, courts employ various balancing tests
and view the totality of circumstances.' 23 This approach reduces the consti-
tutional analysis of urinalysis drug-testing programs to a case-by-case exer-
cise.
B. Alternative Constitutional Challenges
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution
provide that no State shall deprive a person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. 2 ' Complainants to drug-testing programs,
though not as frequently or as successfully, have asserted that these programs
violate the above constitutional provisions.
1. The Due Process Challenge
It is well-settled law that one's property 'interest in his or her job cannot
be abrogated by a government employer without due process.'25 Often, it is
argued that drug-testing programs run afoul of this protection. For example,
in Capua, firefighters argued their property rights in their jobs, and in their
individual reputations, were abrogated and arbitrarily and capriciously in-
fringed by government officials. 26 The court accepted this argument, holding
that the government violated the dictates of due process because the unan-
nounced mass urinalysis testing was devoid of procedural due process safe-
guards. 2 v The court noted the program lacked confidentiality provisions,
and was unilaterally imposed as a condition of employment. Furthermore,
Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
The existence of reasonable suspicion has been explained as follows: "There is reasonable
suspicion when there is some articulable basis for suspecting that the employee is using illegal
drugs. Put another way, there is reasonable suspicion when there is some quantum of individ-
ualized suspicion as opposed to an inarticulate hunch." Smith v. White, 666 F. Supp. 1085,
1089 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (citations omitted), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1988).
123. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (balancing police station safety
versus arrestees' rights).
124. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
125. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (state statute plainly
created property right in the jobs of civil service employees); Johnson v. United States, 628
F.2d 187, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (employee could not be dismissed but for cause, and thereby
clearly enjoyed a property interest protected by due process); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp.
1500, 1504 (D.D.C. 1986) (cause requirement for termination, protecting against arbitrary and
capricious employer actions, confers property interest which cannot be denied without due
process), rev'd, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
126. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
127. Id. at 1520-21.
[Vol. 39:161
1989] REASONABLE DR UG-TESTING
the court argued that the unreliability of urinalysis testing 2" presented further
concern, and offended traditional notions of fundamental fairness and due
process. 129
The Capua decision highlights the manner in which complainants utilize
the due process clause to challenge drug-testing programs. In order to avail
themselves of the protection of the due process clause, complainants often
attack the lack of any procedural safeguards or the unreliability of the
applied tests.130
2. The Equal Protection Challenge
The constitutionality of drug-testing programs is also challenged as vio-
lative of equal protection. Generally, in reviewing an equal protection chal-
lenge, courts presume that legislation or a regulation is valid and sustain it
if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.' It is therefore the burden of the plaintiff to demonstrate the
requirements imposed by law or regulation "so lack rationality that they
constitute a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection."' 2 The
equal protection challenges to drug-testing programs are often similar to the
challenge found in Poole v. Stephens.'
In Poole, correction officer recruits were subject to random drug-testing,
while the correction officers themselves were only subject to testing on
reasonable individualized suspicion.114 Plaintiff recruit complained this proc-
128. Id. at 1521.
129. This Comment does not comprehensively examine the available urinalysis tests and their
reliability. However, this should not serve to diminish the importance placed in the reliability
of these tests, and the weight this is afforded in constitutional analysis. See Miller, supra note
3; Comment, supra note 2 (accuracy depends on the administering operator's expertise and the
proper identification of each urine specimen at various levels of custody, and further, the
validity of urinalysis testing is severely limited because it cannot determine the level of intoxi-
cation); Note, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Need for Quality Assurance Legislation, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 877 (1987) (regardless of which method, or combination of methods, is used,
incorrect results are always a possibility because the methodology of the immunoassay is based
on immune reactions and a certain degree of cross-reactivity occurs among various drug
metabolites).
130. One study has indicated that false positive results from the EMIT test can be as high
as ten percent. Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine Screenings for Misused Drugs, 16 J. Psy-
CHOACTIVE DRuGs 305, 312 (Oct.-Dec. 1984).
For a case in which an employee advanced both substantive and procedural due process
violations in connection with drug testing, see Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d
1139 (3d Cir. 1988).
131. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985).
132. Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 688 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1029 (1981) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)).
133. 688 F. Supp. 149 (D.N.J. 1988). See also Chaney v. Southern Ry., 847 F.2d 718 (1Ith
Cir. 1988) (in an equal protection challenge, case was remanded for a determination if the
EMIT test had an adverse effect on blacks).
134. 688 F. Supp. at 156-57.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
ess denied him equal protection of law. The court, in rejecting plaintiff's
complaint, noted that the recruits and officers were engaged in different
activities in different settings, and emphasized the intense training recruits
endured.'35 Thie court stated it was reasonable and rational to weed out drug
abusers before entrusting them with running the prisons. Furthermore, the
court reasoned it was rational for prison officials to conclude that those
individuals who passed random testing at the recruit level needed only to be
tested upon reasonable individualized suspicion. a6
The court in Poole also considered an equal protection challenge raised
by the correction officers. The officers complained that because civilians in
regular contact with inmates were not subject to reasonable suspicion testing,
the drug-testing policy was tainted by "underinclusion" and thereby violative
of equal protection. 3 7 Again, the court rejected this argument, reasoning
that the state was allowed to rationally take one step at a time. 3 ' In support,
the court inferred from the evidence that the Department would expand the
program in the future. 3 9
II. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
The serious and potentially devastating effects of drug abuse have quickly
ushered the constitutionality issue of drug-testing programs to this land's
highest Court. The two Supreme Court opinions discussed in this Comment,
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab140 and Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives Association, '4' provided the vehicle for discussion of this
issue.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 157.
138. Id. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Shoemaker v.
Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
139. Opponents of drug-testing programs have also argued that drug-testing programs were
violative of their fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and their penumbral rights
of privacy. However, both of these arguments have found little support.
In Egloff v. New Jersey Nat'l Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275, 1282 (D.N.J. 1988), the court,
applying the rationale of the Schmerber Court, held chemical analysis of bodily fluids did not
involve "testimonial compulsion," and therefore extinguished any fifth amendment incrimi-
nation argument.
Similarly, the court in Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency,
663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987), rejected a penumbral rights of privacy argument. Plaintiff
Union advanced the argument that the drug-testing program violated the constitutional right
to privacy established in Roe v. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut. However, the court, citing
the rationale of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), held there was no broad right to
privacy, and reasoned that here the interests did not rise to the level of an independent
fundamental right. Amalgamated, 663 F. Supp. at 1571-72.
140. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
141. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
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A. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
In Von Raab, the United States Customs Service issued a directive which
implemented a urinalysis drug-screening program. 42 This program required
testing of individuals who were either initially applying for, or seeking
transfer to, three types of jobs: positions that either directly involved the
interdiction of illicit drugs, required the carrying of a firearm, or involved
access to classified information. 43 Von Raab considered only the constitu-
tionality of the program as it applied to current employees seeking a transfer.
Under the program, the Service notified a potential transferring employee
that his appointment was contingent upon successful completion of a drug-
screening test.'" A urinalysis test was then scheduled for the potential
transferor, with the option of withdrawal left to the individual. At the test
site, an employee is requested to enter a restroom stall and produce a urine
sample. 45 An observer remains in the restroom to listen for the sounds of
urination, but does not visually observe the act of urination. Subsequently,
a tamper-proof seal is affixed to the bottle, and, after strict chain-of-custody
procedures, the sample is mailed to the laboratory. The laboratory initially
screens the sample by the enzyme-multiplied-immunoassay technique
("EMIT"), 46 and if the result is positive, then applies the gas chromatog-
raphy/mass spectrometer ("GC/MS") test. 47 Finally, if the GC/MS result
is positive, the employee may designate a laboratory to test the original
sample independently.
The district court enjoined all drug testing, holding the program violated
the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.' 4 8 Next, the circuit court considered the constitutionality of the pro-
gram. Initially, the court addressed whether the urinalysis testing constituted
a search. The court reasoned that the private nature of passing urine, and
the possible disclosure of information apart from the presence of illicit drugs,
dictated that the testing constituted a search. 49 Having made this determi-
nation, the tribunal next considered whether the search was reasonable.
Noting that the program did not require individualized suspicion, the court
found it necessary to weigh the factors suggesting constitutional violation
against all of those indicating validity.5 0
142. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 173.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 174.
146. See supra note 129. The EMIT test utilizes the production of drug antibodies in
interaction with enzymatic detectors to identify the metabolites of drugs in urine. Morgan,
supra note 130, at 308.
147. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 174. GC/MS involves a separation of drug metabolite components
and detection. See Caplan, Drug Testing in Urine: Understanding the Factors and the Process,
1984 A.B.A., DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE 6.
148. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 386 (E.D. La. 1986).
149. 816 F.2d at 175-76.
150. Id. at 177.
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The court first indicated the scope and manner of the testing were suffi-
ciently limited. Specifically, the court reasoned the intrusiveness of the search
was minimal, as there was no visual observation of the employee and the
employee was notified in advance of the testing.'' Furthermore, the court
noted the tests were either positive or negative, and therefore left no room
for official discretion. 5 2 Next, the court reasoned the national interest in
preventing drug smuggling provided justification for the testing. The court
emphasized it was essential that the individuals responsible for preventing
drug smuggling be drug-free themselves.' 53 Otherwise, the court reasoned,
the customs agent might be susceptible to bribery, or even tempted to divert
seized contraband for his or her own use. 5 4 Additionally, the court noted
that a rest room was the most private facility practicable, and also recognized
the voluntary nature of submitting to the test.' 5
The court also considered the employment relationship between the gov-
ernment and the Customs Service agents in determining if the program was
reasonable. The court reasoned that the relationship allowed government
employees to be subject to searches or other restraints of liberty that would
otherwise be impermissible, so long as the restraints were aimed at assuring
integrity and competence. 5 6 In the instant case, the court held that the
consent requirement imposed here was reasonable in light of the nature and
responsibilities of the job. 5 7 Finally, the court noted that alternative sources
of information did not eliminate the need for urine testing, and that the test
was a "sufficiently productive mechanism" for fulfilling its objectives. 5 8
Accordingly, the court found the search implicated by the drug-testing
program was reasonable.
The court also summarily dismissed a contention that the testing violated
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.' 59 Specifically, the court
reasoned urine samples revealed only "physical characteristics," and were
not testimonial in nature. 60 Finally, the court stated the testing was not so
unreliable as to violate due process.' 6'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 62 to determine whether the Customs
Service's program violated the fourth amendment protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 178.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 179.
158. Id. at 180 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979)).
159. Id. at 181.
160. Id.
161. Id. See supra note 129 (articles discussing test reliability).
162. 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
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1. The Majority's Analysis 163
The Court first addressed the issue of whether the program's urinalysis
testing constituted a search.' 64 Citing the companion opinion of Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives Association, 165 the Court summarily held that the
testing constituted a search.' 66 Next, the Court considered whether the testing
program satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment.
The Court first acknowledged the general rule favoring either the issuance
of a warrant based upon probable cause' 6' or some measure of individualized
suspicion. However, these requirements, the Court reasoned, were not in-
dispensable components of a reasonable search.' 68 Instead, the Court stated
that where a "Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance
the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to
determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion in the particular context.' ' 69 In reviewing the Cus-
toms Service's testing, the Court noted the program was not designed to
serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement, 170 and further noted that the
substantial governmental interests of deterring drug use and preventing
promotion of drug users presented a special governmental need. Accordingly,
the Court invoked the "special needs" exception to the fourth amendment
and held that departure from the ordinary warrant, probable cause, and
individualized suspicion requirements was justified.' 7'
163. The Customs Service drug-testing program applies to three classes of employees: 1)
those directly involved in drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws; 2) those required
to carry firearms; and, 3) those required to handle "classified material." National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). The Court's opinion does not assess
the reasonableness of the program toward this third class of employees, as, on the present
record, the Court was unable to determine if the category was limited to those who had access
to sensitive information. Id. at 1396-97. Accordingly, this issue was remanded to the court of
appeals. Id. at 1397.
164. Id. at 1390.
165. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
166. 109 S. Ct. at 1390.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1390-91. Justice Kennedy noted that test results could not be used in a criminal
prosecution without the employee's consent. Id.
171. 109 S. Ct. at 1393. In dispensing with the need for a warrant, the Court reasoned that
common sense militated against requiring a warrant for every work-related intrusion, as it
would prohibit an office from functioning properly. Id. at 1391. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (plurality opinion) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983));
see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (to require teacher to obtain warrant
before searching student would unduly interfere with disciplinary procedures of schools).
The Court also reasoned that a warrant requirement would divert valuable agency resources
from the primary mission of interdicting drug smuggling. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy noted
the warrant would provide minimal additional protection, as the applying employees were
automatically subject to the test, and thereby escaped discretion of an official in the field. 109
S. Ct. at 1391.
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Having dismissed the need for a warrant or probable cause, the Court
employed a balancing test to determine the program's reasonableness. The
Court balanced the valid public interests against the interference with the
individual liberties of the customs agents. In applying this balancing test,
the Court noted the public interest in eradicating the drug problem, and
emphasized that the most formidable defense to this problem was the Cus-
toms Service. 172 Due to this prominent position, the Court recognized the
government's compelling interest in assuring that the Service's personnel
were physically fit and possessed unimpeachable integrity and judgment.'73
Without these characteristics, the majority feared employees would be un-
sympathetic to their mission of interdicting narcotics, and might even aid
the importation of drugs. 74 The Court also feared the potential dangers of
drug users who carried firearms, and ruled the public should not have to
bear these risks.
7 5
Against these public interests, the Court weighed the interference with
individual liberties that urinalysis testing imposed. The Court conceded that
invasion of privacy with urinalysis testing could be significant in certain
circumstances, but also recognized that certain forms of public employment
diminished privacy expectations. 7 6 The Court included the Customs Service
positions among these forms of employment with a lessened expectation of
privacy, reasoning that individuals responsible for drug interdiction, and
those that carried firearms, "reasonably should expect effective inquiry into
their fitness and probity.' ' 7  In light of this, the majority held the govern-
ment's interests outweighed the employees' privacy interests.
The Court also considered two further contentions which the petitioners
asserted demonstrated the testing program's unreasonableness. The petition-
ers argued the program violated the fourth amendment because first, the
testing was not expected to reveal any drug use, 78 and second, the scheme
was not a "sufficiently productive mechanism," as detection could be avoided
172. 109 S. Ct. at 1392.
173. Id. at 1393. The Court recognized the need for these characteristics in Customs Service
employees because of the employees' frequent exposure to the criminal element associated with
drugs, and of exposure to the controlled substances themselves. The majority reasoned the
employees would be tempted both by bribes from the drug traffickers, and their own propensity
to steal the seized contraband. Id. at 1392.
In further emphasizing the inherent dangers and enticements of the employee's positions, the
Court noticed certain findings of the Agency's Commissioner. Specifically, the Commissioner
noted nine officers died in the line of duty since 1974, and several officers were removed from
the Service for accepting bribes. Id.
174. Id. at 1393.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1393-94. The Court gave as examples military and intelligence personnel. Id. at
1393.
177. Id. at 1394.
178. 109 S. Ct. at 1394. Petitioners argued the program was not implemented in response to
a perceived drug problem, and further emphasized that to date, the testing had not revealed a
significant number of drug users. Id.
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with abstinence or adulteration.179 The Court found both arguments unper-
suasive. Concerning the lack of revealed drug use, the Court reasoned that
there was little reason to believe that the Service was immune from this
pervasive social problem, and that the minimal number of positive tests in
the Service did not impugn the program's validity. 180 The Court also rejected
the petitioner's concerns of abstinence and adulteration. Specifically, the
Court noted that abstinence would be difficult and that many individuals
would be ignorant of the "fade-away" effect""' of drugs. The possibility of
adulteration, the Court reasoned, was also slight, as the sample collector
employed precautions to ensure the integrity of the sample.'
8 2
2. The Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented. s3 The dissent empha-
sized that there existed no documented drug use in the Service nor any
instances of bribery, unsympathetic law enforcement, or the dangerous use
of a firearm. 1 4 This lack of demonstrated evils, Justice Scalia reasoned,
prevented any special need for a suspicionless search or seizure, and thereby
distinguished the instant case from that line of cases upholding suspicionless
searches and seizures." 5
Justice Scalia also disagreed with the program's testing of those employees
who carried firearms. The Justice argued this testing exposed an inordinate
number of public employees to a needless indignity, and feared it would
extend to any employee potentially dangerous under the influence of drugs.18 6
Justice Scalia also feared the program's testing of employees with access to
"sensitive information""'s similarly attached a broad scope, and warned it
approved testing for all federal employees with security clearance.
179. Id. at 1395.
180. Id. In advancing this reasoning, Justice Kennedy pointed to the similar paucity of guilty
individuals of those required to submit to suspicionless housing code inspections, and of those
motorists stopped at checkpoints. Id.
181. Id. at 1395.
182. Id. at 1396.
183. 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
dissented on the basis that the majority's balancing test violated the fourth amendment's
requirement of probable cause, as he explained more fully in his dissent in Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Alternatively, he
agreed with the argument made by Justice Scalia in his dissent, and that advanced by the
dissenting judge below. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170,
182-84 (5th Cir. 1987) (Hill, J., dissenting).
184. 109 S. Ct. at 1399 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 173 (1987)
("the Commissioner has described the [Customs] Service as 'largely drug free."').
185. 109 S. Ct. at 1398.
186. Id. at 1400-01. As examples, Justice Scalia offered automobile drivers, operators of
other potentially dangerous equipment, construction workers, and school crossing guards. Id.
at 1401.
187. Id.
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In sum, the Von Raab Court employed the "special needs" exception and
thereby dispensed with the warrant and individualized suspicion requirements
of the fourth amendment. In place of these requirements, the Court applied
a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of the Service's testing
program. The Court reasoned that the national interest in eradicating the
drug problem outweighed the infringement of individual liberties and there-
fore held the program was not violative of constitutional protection.
B. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive's Association"'8
The conflict which the Supreme Court addressed in Skinner was presented
below in Railway Labor Executives Association v. Burnley.8 9 In Burnley,
the Labor Association challenged regulations' 90 mandating blood and urine
tests of employees after serious train accidents and other fatal incidents.' 9'
Following the accident or incident, the regulations required blood and urine
samples to be taken from all crew members of the involved, train. The district
court upheld the constitutionality of the regulations, and mandatory post-
accident testing began shortly thereafter. 9 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit,
following precedent, first conceded a search occurred, reasoning that an
individual possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bodily fluids.
Next, the court noted that the exigency of determining the existence of
alcohol or drugs in urine rendered the warrant requirement impracticable. 9
Though dismissing the need for a warrant, the court refused to apply the
administrative warrant exception to the testing program. 94 The court rea-
soned the exception was inapplicable because the program implicated searches
of persons, whereas all previous administrative warrant cases involved searches
of property.
Having refused to presume the reasonableness of the program under the
guise of the administrative warrant exception, the court next focused on the
applicable standard to determine this reasonableness. The court adopted a
balancing test, reasoning that it was necessary to balance the railroad em-
ployees' expectations of privacy against the governmental interest in the safe
and efficient operation of the railroads. 95 In weighing these factors, the
court noted it was incumbent upon it to determine first, whether the search
was justified at its inception, and second, whether the search was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference., 96 To
be justified at its inception, the court held the toxicological testing of the
188. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
189. 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
190. 49 C.F.R. § 219 (1988).
191. 839 F.2d at 577.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 583.
194. Id. at 584,
195. Id.
196. Id. at 587.
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employees had to be based on a particularized suspicion. Involvement in an
accident, the court reasoned, did not provide this suspicion. 97 Next, the
court ruled the blood and urine tests were not reasonably related in scope
as they could not measure either current drug intoxication or degree of
impairment. This reality, the court reasoned, made it imperative that the
drug testing be conducted on only individual suspicion. 9
Again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari' 99 to consider whether the
drug-testing program violated the fourth amendment's restriction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
1. The Majority's Analysis"°
Justice Kennedy first addressed petitioner's contention that the regulations
did not require government action20 and therefore did not implicate fourth
amendment protection. 20 2 The Court noted that the regulations preempted
state laws, rules, or regulations covering the same subject matter, and
superseded collective bargaining and arbitration agreements. The regulations,
the majority emphasized, also enabled the Federal Railroad Administration
to receive biological samples and test results, and failed to offer the employees
a power of denial. 03 In light of these provisions, the Court held the requisite
government action was present, as the government had encouraged, endorsed,
and participated in the testing program. 204
The Court next considered whether the regulation's procedures consti-
tuted a search. 20 5 The Court summarily held that the "compelled intru-
sion" of both blood testing and breathalyzer tests infringed a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and thereby constituted a search. 20 6 Though absent
any surgical intrusion, as with blood testing, the Court also held that
urinalysis testing involved a search. The Court reasoned that the testing
could reveal a host of physiological facts 07 and emphasized the intru-
197. Id. at 587.
198. Id. at 588-89.
199. 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988).
200. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor and Scalia. Justice Stevens concurred in part and in
the judgment. 109 S. Ct. at 1407.
201. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (discussing governmental action require-
ment).
202. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). Petitioners argued that Subpart D of the regulations did not
compel any testing by private individuals, and therefore lacked the required governmental
action. Id. at 1411. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 219.301 to .309 (1988).
203. 109 S. Ct. at 1411-12.
204. Id. at 1412.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1413. Justice Kennedy specifically noted the ability to determine if an individual
was an epileptic, pregnant or diabetic.
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siveness of the collecting process, which often involved visual or aural
monitoring.20
Having found both the government action and search requirements satis-
fied, the Court next inquired as to the reasonableness of the drug-testing
program. Justice Kennedy first recognized the desire to have searches con-
ducted pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. However,
the Justice also noted that exceptions had been forged to this rule, including
when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable. ' 20 9 The Court
held the government's interest of ensuring safe rail transportation constituted
one of these "special needs," and therefore dismissed the warrant and
individual suspicion requirements. Instead, the Court balanced governmental
and privacy interests to determine the program's reasonableness.
In dismissing the need for a search warrant, Justice Kennedy reasoned the
regulations entrusted minimal discretion to those administering the program
and also contained safeguards limiting the potential for abuse of this minimal
discretion.2 0 The Court also reasoned that the government's interest in
dispensing with the warrant requirement was substantial. Specifically, the
Court held that the delay caused by procuring a warrant might lead to the
destruction of valuable evidence, namely the presence of drugs or alcohol. 2 '
Next, the Court inquired as to the need for probable cause or individualized
suspicion. Though normally required, the Court held individualized suspicion
was not an irreducible requirement of a reasonable search, and could be
dismissed if it would jeopardize significant governmental interests and intrude
on only minimal privacy interests." 2 Concerning privacy interests, the Court
first noted that the regulations minimized the intrusiveness of the collection
208. 109 S. Ct. at 1413. In discussing the private act of urination, the majority quoted the
Fifth Circuit, stating:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of
urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a
function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance
in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.
Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir.
1987)).
209. 109 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in judgment). As examples of these "special needs" exceptions, Justice Kennedy
offered Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 968 (1987) (search of probationer's home); New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703 (1987) (search of premises of certain highly regulated
businesses); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721-25 (1987) (plurality opinion) (work-related
searches of employees' desks and offices); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985)
(search of student's property by school officials); and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60
(1979) (body cavity searches of prison inmates).
210. 109 S. Ct. at 1415-16. Justice Kennedy reasoned the narrow discretion allowed by the
regulations provided virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to review. Id.
211. Id. at 1416.
212. Id. at 1417.
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process." 3 More importantly, however, the Court reasoned that the privacy
expectations of the covered employees were diminished because of their
participation in a highly regulated industry." 4 Accordingly, the Court found
the employees' privacy interests minimal. Conversely, the Court held the
governmental interests in testing without individualized suspicion were com-
pelling.2"5 The Court reasoned that the employees' position suggested disas-
trous consequences if they were to improperly perform their duties.21 6 The
regulations, the Court reasoned, provided an effective means of deterring
drug use, and thereby served the compelling governmental interest. 1 7 The
Court noted the testing also allowed the securing of invaluable information
about the causes of accidents. Collection of this information, reasoned the
Court, would be impeded by a requirement of individualized suspicion. 211
Hence, the Court dismissed any need for individualized suspicion.
Finally, the majority addressed the appellate court's argument that the
urinalysis-testing regulations were unreasonable because of their failure to
measure current intoxication or degree of impairment. The Court rejected
this contention on several grounds. First, the Court reasoned that the evidence
need not be conclusive, but instead only exhibit a tendency to make the
existence of a consequential fact more or less probable. 21 9 Second, the Court
emphasized the urine tests were a secondary source of information, designed
to detect traces that were cleansed from the bloodstream. 20 Finally, the
Court noted that the regulations were not only designed to detect impairment,
but also to deter use. 221
2. The Dissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, arguing the "special
needs" exception asserted by the majority was unprincipled and dangerous. 222
Justice Marshall asserted that the instant use of the "special needs" exception
differed dangerously in two ways from previous use of the exception. 223
213. Id. at 1418. The Court noted the regulations did not require direct observation during
the collection process, and also reasoned the intrusion was minimal because of its similarity to
a regular physical examination. Id.
214. Id. at 1418.
215. Id. at 1419.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1419-20.
218. Id. at 1420. The majority noted the often.chaotic atmosphere at the scene of a serious
rail accident, and the inherent difficulties in obtaining evidence of a particularized suspicion in
such surroundings.
219. Id. at 1421 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401).
220. Id. at 1421.
221. Id.
222. 109 S. Ct. at 1426 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1425. As examples of previous use of the exception, Justice Marshall cited Griffin
v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 968 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion);
and New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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First, the Justice noted past uses of the exception were applied to searches
of person's possessions, not to searches of persons. 24 Second, the previous
exception cases, Justice Marshall noted, all contained an element of individ-
ualized suspicion, which was not required in the instant case. 221 These
differences, Justice Marshall argued, signaled the unfortunate abandonment
of any probable cause requirement for civil searches, and instead substituted
a manipulable balancing inquiry. 22 Justice Marshall argued this malleable
balancing approach gave undue weight to policy concerns, and left one's
"right to be let alone" totally unprotected by the fourth amendment. 227
In place of this "special needs" balancing approach, Justice Marshall
promoted the traditional fourth, amendment analytical framework. Justice
Marshall urged the Court to inquire, serially, whether a search occurred,22
whether the search was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant or under an
exception to the warrant requirement,2 29 whether the search was based on
probable cause or a lesser suspicion,230 and whether the search was conducted
in a reasonable manner.23' Following this formula, Justice Marshall agreed
with the majority that a search occurred. However, the dissenting Justice
disagreed with the majority's dispensing of the warrant requirement. 23 2
Specifically, Justice Marshall noted that the program imposed three distinct
searches, namely the two of collecting blood and urine samples, and the
third search of chemically analyzing the samples. 2 3 The Justice agreed the
first two searches could be conducted absent a warrant under the "exigent
circumstances" doctrine.234 However, Justice Marshall saw no such exigency
preventing the securing of a warrant before the samples were analyzed, 233
and accordingly argued a warrant was required.
Though offended by the lack of a warrant, Justice Marshall found the
dispensing of any probable cause or individualized suspicion even more
violative of fourth amendment principles. Justice Marshall noted precedent
224. 109 S. Ct. at 1425.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1426.
228. Id. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 399 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967) (the government
conducts a search when it invades an interest that an individual justifiably seeks to keep private).
229. 109 S. Ct. at 1426; see, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984) (exceptions
to the warrant requirement are few in number and narrowly drawn).
230. 109 S. Ct. at 1426; see, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1979) (the
Court has allowed limited intrusion searches .on the basis of reasonable suspicion).
231. 109 S. Ct. at 1426; see, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763-66 (1985) (surgical
removal of a bullet is not a "reasonable" search).
232. 109 S. Ct. at 1426.
233. id.
234. Id. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) ("[T]he delay necessary to
obtain a warrant . . . threaten[s] the 'destruction of evidence' ").
235. 109 S. Ct. at 1426. Justice Marshall reasoned that the samples would not spoil if properly
collected and preserved, and expected that railroad officials could easily understand the warrant
process. Id.
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required probable cause for full-scale personal searches 2 6 and, in an instance
of minimal intrusion, still required individualized suspicion, 23 7 The dissent
discounted the majority's holding that the intrusions were minimal, and
instead argued the intrusions constituted full-scale personal searches requiring
probable cause.23 s In support, Justice Marshall argued the majority's use of
the "highly-regulated industry" exception was misplaced. Specifically, the
Justice noted the industry exception had previously applied only to employer
property, and not the individual employees themselves." 9 To extend the
exception such, Justice Marshall stated, was to set "a dangerous and ill-
conceived precedent. "240
Finaily, Justice Marshall argued that even if he employed the majority's
balancing test, he would still find the program invalid. Justice Marshall
maintained the benefits of the program were far outweighed by the costs to
personal liberties, and emphasized the majority erroneously sided with the
governmental interests by incorrectly viewing the procedure's intrusions as
minimal. 241 In support of the program's intrusiveness, Justice Marshall noted
the ability of criminal prosecutors to obtain the samples, 42 the inability of
urinalysis testing to measure current impairment, and the limited deterrence
effect of the program.2 43
II1. ANALYSIS
As noted earlier, fourth amendment analysis is quite complex and is not
capable of precise definition or application. Unfortunately, the end result of
this complexity often is misguided and incorrect fourth amendment analysis,
and the unwarranted infringement of individual's privacy rights.
This unfortunate result is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's approval
of the drug-testing programs in the Von Raab and Skinner opinions. In
particular, though the "special needs" exception is the correct tool to apply
in the drug-testing arena, the Supreme Court ill-advisedly stretched the
boundaries of the exception2 44 in these cases, This unwarranted extension,
namely to searches lacking in individualized suspicion or realized harm, is
236. Id. at 1427.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1429.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1430.
241. 109 S. Ct. at 1430-31.
242. See 49 C.F.R. § 219.211(d) (1987) ("Each sample . . . may be made available to ... a
party in litigation upon service of appropriate compulsory process on the custodian of the
sample ...").
243. 109 S. Ct. at 1430-32.
244. The "special needs" exception, as forwarded by Justice Blackmun in his concurring
opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O., provides that "in those exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable .... a court [is] entitled to substitute its balancing of interests
for that of the Framers." 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
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exercised in both the Von Raab and Skinner decisions, though at different
stages. In Von Raab, the Court, ignoring any reasonable suspicion analysis,
summarily dismissed the obvious deficiency of any drug problem or concom-
itant harm in the Customs Service.2 45 Instead, the Court was blinded by the
government's interest in eradicating the national drug problem. 46 A require-
ment of individualized suspicion or of a realized harm, as in previous "special
needs" exception cases, would have prevented this erroneous balancing
analysis. In the Skinner decision, in contrast, the Court initially exercises
proper application of the "special needs" exception. This proper application
stems from the existence of a realized harm, namely documented drug and
alcohol abuse in the railroad industry. However, by extending the reach of
the exception to the chemical analysis of the collected samples, the Skinner
Court joins the Von Raab Court in misapplying the exception. More specif-
ically, the Skinner Court fails to recognize that once the samples are collected,
the warrant and probable cause requirements are no longer impracticable,
and therefore the "special needs" exception is rendered inapplicable.
A. The Von Raab Court's
Misapplication of the "Special Needs" Exception
An early Supreme Court opinion espoused the theory that "[a] close and
literal construction [of constitutional provisions for the security of persons
and property] deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual
depreciation of the right .... "247 In Boyd v. United States,248 the early
Court, in finding an unreasonable search and seizure, emphasized the courts'
role as protectors of constitutional rights. 249 In Von Raab, the Court heeds
the words of the Boyd Court, and exercises a broad and sweeping construc-
tion of the fourth amendment. However, this construction is employed not
to safeguard constitutional rights, but instead to justify the agency's drug-
testing program. The vehicle for this justification is the "special needs"
exception.
By employing the "special needs" exception, a court overlooks any warrant
or probable cause requirement, and instead, applies only a balancing test to
determine a search's reasonableness.250 Previous to the Von Raab decision,
all "special needs" cases involved either an element of individualized sus-
picion or realized harm which was mitigated by the search, and usually
245. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
246. See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
247. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
248. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
249. Id.
250. See cases cited supra note 209. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Skinner,
application of this balancing analysis has led to a finding of reasonable searches in all the
"special needs" cases. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1424-25
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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both.25" ' The Von Raab decision, though, lacks both an individualized sus-
picion and a realized harm, and therefore represents a misapplication of the
"special needs" exception.
The Customs Service testing program25 2 is implemented upon an employee's
voluntary application to transfer to a covered position. After voluntary
application, all employees are required to submit to urinalysis tests. This all-
inclusive aspect renders unnecessary any requirement of probable cause or
individualized suspicion, 253 and therefore places this program outside the
scope of the "special needs" exception. Under a correct application of the
"special needs" exception, intrusiveness is minimized, because individualized
suspicion provides for a limited number of searches. Without such individ-
ualized suspicion, numerous innocent parties are unnecessarily subjected to
infringements of their privacy. 2 4 Also, by foregoing any probable cause or
suspicion analysis, the Court, swept away by the emotion of the drug
problem, 255 is free to ignore the lack of drug use in the Service. A requirement
251. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 968 (1987) (suspicion that probationer possessed
contraband; harm to society if probationers allowed at large); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709 (1987) (plurality opinion) (suspicion that employee was misusing funds; harm that govern-
mental operations would be disrupted by a probable cause requirement in order to search public
employees' offices); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (individualized suspicion that
student had possession of drugs; harm of disrupting school environment); cf. New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (realized harm of auto theft under the administrative search
exception).
252. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
253. In fact, the Commissioner of the Customs Service stated he believed the Service was
largely drug free, that employees' use of drugs was not the reason for instituting the program,
and that he expected very few positive screenings. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1400 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986). The Capua court stated:
The invidious effect of such mass, roundup urinalysis is that it casually sweeps up
the innocent with the guilty and willingly sacrifices each individual's Fourth Amend-
ment rights in the name of some larger public interest .... Such an unfounded
presumption of guilt is contrary to the protection against arbitrary and intrusive
government interference set forth in the Constitution.
Id. at 1517.
255. In his dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out that the only justification for the Customs
testing program was to demonstrate that the government is serious in its "war on drugs." This
symbolic use of urinalysis testing is insufficient to justify the invasion of personal privacy it
entails. Justice Scalia accused the Court of upholding the testing on this basis, although offering
other justifications in its opinion. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1401 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Von Raab decision is not the first instance of public emotion leading to the unnecessary
abandonment of constitutional protection. History also offers the following: Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (first amendment not violated by statute making illegal the advocacy
of overthrowing the government); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (no
constitutional violation by relocation of Japanese citizens); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 91 (1943) (no violation of due process or equal protection to impose curfew on Japanese
citizens); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (no first amendment violation under
statute which prohibited mailing of circular urging draftees not to comply with conscription
orders).
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of individualized suspicion would force the Court to focus on the existence
or absence of a real problem. The presence of a realized harm is necessary
to prevent a misguided balancing analysis that results when policy concerns
are examined exclusively.256
Just as important an oversight by the Court is its failure to realize that
the Service's testing program mitigates no harm. Again, this absence places
the program outside the parameters of the "special needs" exception. First,
as noted above, there exists neither documented drug use among Service
employees, nor any expectations that testing will reveal such drug use. 2" In
contrast, the New Jersey v. T.L.O. 25s Court, in applying the "special needs"
exception, specifically noted the growing disorder in American schools,
including drug use and violent crime. This unrest provided a harm for the
search to lessen. 219 Second, and most importantly, the majority's implication
that the drug testing will mitigate a harm, namely national drug abuse, is
erroneous. Clearly, the national drug problem lies deeper than drug abuse
in the Customs Service. 261 The significant intrusion of suspicionless searches
of the Customs employees is unwarranted by any minimal effect the searches
may have on the national drug problem. Indeed, the probable reason for
the program is its symbolic value; it may serve to demonstrate the govern-
ment's commitment to eradicating the national drug problem.2 6'
Again, the T.L.O. decision provides a contrast.262 In T.L.O., a school
official searched a student's purse and recovered marijuana. The seizure of
256. There exists substantial precedent in the drug-testing context concerning the individu-
alized suspicion requirement. For cases requiring individualized suspicion, see Division 241
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029
(1976); Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n of New Jersey, Local 318 v. Township of Washington,
672 F. Supp. 779 (D.N.J. 1987), rev'd, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643
F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986). For cases not requiring individualized suspicion, see McDonnell
v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986); Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 1279 v. Cambria County Transit
Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Pa. 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dole, 670
F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1987). For one definition of reasonable suspicion, see supra note 122.
257. See supra note 253.
258. 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
259. Id. at 339-40.
260. It is conceded drug-free Customs Service employees may lead to more efficient and
more substantial interdiction of drugs. However, reality dictates that even a fully operative
Service will never succeed in capturing more than a small percentage of illegally smuggled drugs.
Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, 1988 CHICAGO LAWYER 13 (Oct.).
The extent of the drug problem, and the resulting minimal effect of the Service's interdiction
efforts, is also illustrated in Sciolino, Drug Production Rising Worldwide, State Dept. Says,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1989, at I, col. 2. Specifically, the article highlights the increased global
production of coca, marijuana, opium poppies and hashish, and the inability of the United
States to control the world events which have led to this global increase in production.
261. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1401 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (an unreasonable search cannot be justified on symbolic grounds).
262. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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the marijuana and the subsequent disciplinary action of the student directly
affected the school drug problem. Thus, though the Von Raab Court applied
the correct fourth amendment exception for drug-testing programs, the
"special needs" test, its failure to require either an individualized suspicion
or a realized harm lead to the misapplication of the exception. In place of
these requirements, the Court found that there was a special need simply
because the drug problem is a national concern and the Customs department
is involved in drug interdiction. However, this misapplication, and the
concurrent skewed balancing analysis, is capable of remedy. The most ef-
fective remedy would be congressional action in the form of national drug-
testing legislation. Legislation requiring either an individualized suspicion or
a realized harm or both, in order for the government to undertake drug
testing, (see Appendix) would prevent this misapplication.
B. The Skinner Court's Proper Application
of the "Special Needs" Exception
The Court's opinion in Skinner,2 63 unlike the Von Raab decision, dem-
onstrates a proper application of the "special needs" exception to the fourth
amendment in the initial procurement of the test samples. 261 The decision
provides guidance for implementation of the exception in exigent situations
requiring drug testing. This proper application stems from the existence of
a realized harm, namely drug and alcohol abuse in the railroad industry,2 65
and the ability to mitigate this harm. With this realized harm, the Skinner
decision is consistent with the earlier "special needs" cases, 266 and distin-
guishes itself from the Von Raab decision. The railroad's drug-testing pro-
gram, just as the seizure of marijuana in the T.L.O. decision, 67 will directly
affect the realized harm, and thereby distinguishes itself from the Von Raab
testing program.
263. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
264. The Skinner Court's application of the "special needs" exception to the initial search
of collecting the samples is appropriate. However, it is arguable, as Justice Marshall duly noted
in his dissent, that the extension of the exception to the chemical testing of the samples is
inappropriate. For extensive analysis of this point, see infra notes 268-74 and accompanying
text.
265. Skinner, 109 U.S. at 1407-08. The Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") provided
numerous statistics reflecting the drug and alcohol problem. Specifically, the FRA noted that
from 1972 to 1983 the nation's railroads suffered twenty-one significant accidents of which
drug and alcohol abuse was a contributing factor. These accidents resulted in twenty-five
fatalities, sixty-one non-fatal injuries, and an estimated $19 million in property damage.
Furthermore, there were seventeen additional fatalities which occurred around rail rolling stock
and were blamed on alcohol and drug abuse. Id.; 48 Fed. Reg. 30,726 (1983).
Finally to further emphasize the alcohol abuse problem, a 1979 FRA study stated that one
of eight employees drank at least once while on duty, and alarmingly, that twenty-three percent
of the operating personnel were problem drinkers. 109 S. Ct. at 1407 n.1; 48 Fed. Reg. 30,724
(1983).
266. See supra note 251.
267. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
19891
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Through the correct application of the "special needs" exception, the
Skinner decision demonstrates the exception's purpose. The exception is
intended to apply where certain "needs" make the warrant and probable
cause requirements impracticable. In Skinner, these "needs" are the necessity
to collect samples before the evidence is cleansed from individuals' systems
and the difficulty in establishing any type of individualized suspicion at the
chaotic scene of a railroad accident. These "needs," however, are absent in
the Von Raab situation, because in that case there was no documented drug
use, and therefore no feared loss of evidence of drug use. Furthermore,
there was no event in which it would be difficult to establish individualized
suspicion.
In sum, the requirement of a realized harm capable of mitigation, or a
requirement of individualized suspicion, will ensure the existence of a sub-
stantial government interest and thereby prevent a skewed balancing analysis,
as present in Von Raab. Again, these requirements can be imposed by
legislation (see Appendix).
C. The Skinner Court's Unwarranted Extension of the
"Special Needs" Exception
Though the Skinner Court correctly applies the "special needs" exception
to the collection of the samples, it joins the Von Raab Court in misapplying
the exception by extending it to the testing of these samples. Justice Marshall,
in his dissent in Skinner argued the railroad's drug-testing program imposed
three distinct searches: the first two of collecting blood and urine samples
and the third of chemically analyzing the samples.2 61 Under this premise, 69
the Skinner Court, though applying the "special needs" exception properly
to the first two, 2 70 extended the exception too far to the third. This is because
the "special needs" exception is to be employed when the warrant and
probable cause requirements are impracticable.27 1 In the case of first collecting
the samples, the requirements are impracticable, as there is the danger of
losing valuable evidence and the difficulty of establishing probable cause. 22
However, this impracticability of obtaining a warrant or establishing
probable cause disappears once the samples are collected. At this point, there
268. 109 S. Ct. at 1426 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
269. To view the chemical analysis of the samples as a separate search is supported by the
distinct information which the testing can provide. Specifically, the testing not only reveals the
presence or absence of drugs, but it may also reveal whether an individual is an epileptic, is
pregnant, or is on medication. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d
170, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. at 1384 (1989).
270. See supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
272. The Skinner majority noted the difficulty of establishing probable cause or an individ-
ualized suspicion at the scene of a serious rail accident. In particular, the Court noted the often
chaotic scene, and the inherent difficulty in determining which crew members were involved in
the incident. 109 S. Ct. at 1420.
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no longer exists the exigency of potentially losing valuable evidence, 273 and
it is realistic to expect competency from railroad officials in obtaining a
warrant.2 74 At this stage, the obtaining of a warrant is further facilitated by
the officials' ability to conduct an investigation of the incident. The officials
could obtain necessary facts in order to establish probable cause. Therefore,
to satisfy the constitutional requirement of a reasonable search, a warrant
must be obtained before the samples are analyzed.
The two subject Supreme Court decisions, in differing manners, are neg-
ligent in applying the "special needs" exception, but nevertheless provide
guidance for establishing a constitutionally sufficient program. An analysis
of the two opinions suggests application of the exception should be accom-
panied by an individualized suspicion of drug use or a realized harm capable
of mitigation. Furthermore, it is also necessary to limit the scope of the
exception to the initial collection process, and impose a warrant requirement
thereafter. The model legislation forwarded in the Appendix is intended to
impose such requirements.
IV. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's approval of drug testing in the government and
transportation employer contexts carries both a desirable message and po-
tentially harmful possibilities.
An immediate impact, one characterized with both benefits and detriments,
will be the re-evaluation of existing drug-testing programs and the institution
of new programs.275 The benefits of this include the renewed recognition of
the employment-related drug and alcohol problem2 76 and the concurrent need
for a solution. Furthermore, the Court's promotion of measures to battle
the national drug problem is commendable. However, the Court's instant
opinions, and their failure to require either individualized suspicion or a
realized harm for urinalysis testing, invite implementation of unconstitutional
programs. In particular, the Von Raab decision may establish a precedent
of allowing the government to conduct searches pursuant to the "special
needs" exception based primarily on general policy concerns, such as the
drug issue. If the government can establish that there is a "special need"
based upon policy alone, a reviewing court following Von Raab may uphold
a search of numerous individuals, regardless of any suspicion of wrongdo-
273. 109 S. Ct. at 1426 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that if properly
collected and preserved, the blood and urine samples would not spoil.
274. Id.
275. This trend was immediately demonstrated by HUD's announcement that it would
institute a drug-testing program no later than one month from the day of the decisions. Chicago
Sun Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at 12, col. 2. Furthermore, the Bush Administration's intentions
were reflected in a statement by Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, who suggested that all
drug-testing plans would be re-evaluated in light of the Supreme Court decisions. Id.
276. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
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ing. 2 7 In this manner, the focus of the fourth amendment may shift to the
circumstances surrounding the search, as opposed to the actual search itself.
A finding of "reasonableness" could thus be based on policy concerns, as
opposed to the level of intrusion the government imposes on the individual.
This broadening of the "special needs" exception would severely limit the
protection the fourth amendment provides to individuals. 27 8
The decisions will also fail to end the challenges to drug-testing programs.
First, those opposing drug-testing programs will present the Court's opinions
as being very narrow in scope. Opponents will argue the Von Raab decision
applies only to government agencies directly involved with the interdiction
of drugs, and that the Skinner decision affects only programs in the trans-
portation context. Likewise, opponents may contend that the Court has
created a "drug exception" to the warrant and probable cause requirements
of the fourth amendment; the decisions would then only apply to other drug-
related cases.27 9 Second, opponents will challenge the programs as violative
of due process and equal protection, 2 0 grounds ignored by the Supreme
Court.2"' These continued challenges to drug-testing programs will unfortu-
nately produce both a divergence in the circuits and uncertainty as to the
requirements for a constitutionally infirm program.
These short-range effects of unconstitutional programs and uncertainty as
to the prerequisites for constitutional programs necessitate national legislation
regulating drug testing. 22 This legislation would promote legal uniformity
and, hopefully, with its attached certainty, encourage the institution of
further programs designed to alleviate illegal drug use without violating
individual rights. In particular, the provisions discussed immediately below
are designed to ensure the constitutionality of any drug-testing program.
First, Section 2-2 of the proposed legislation, and its requirement of either
an individualized suspicion or mitigation of a realized harm, significantly
decreases the possibility that a program would violate the fourth amend-
ment's reasonable search and seizure requirement. The individualized sus-
277. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1426 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (the Court has advanced a malleable test, subject to manipulation based on
policy concerns).
278. Id. at 1425.
279. But see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1426 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) Uust as there is no "communist exception," there is no "drug
exception" to the Constitution).
280. See supra notes 124-39 and accompanying text.
281. The due process challenges likely to be forwarded will focus either on a program's lack
of procedural safeguards, or the unreliability of the tests themselves. See supra notes 125-30
and accompanying text. The equal protection challenges, on the other hand, may well focus
on the "over-inclusiveness" of programs which require neither an individualized suspicion nor
a realized harm. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
282. See McGovern, supra note 10, at 39 (advocating drug-testing legislation covering both
public and private employees); Comment, supra note 2, at 1011 (1986) (advocating legislation
to protect the rights of private employees).
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picion requirement will preclude random testing which casually sweeps up
the innocent employees with the guilty, while the realized harm requirement
will ensure that significant government interests are being served with the
testing. Section 2-3 of the legislation also addresses the reasonable search or
seizure requirement. This section, which requires that a warrant be secured
for chemical analysis of the collected samples, recognizes that the exigency
attached to the initial collection of the samples is no longer present upon
testing. This recognition will prevent fourth amendment challenges to the
chemical testing. Finally, sections 3-1 (a) and (b) of the Model Bill are
intended to preclude any due process challenges to the testing program.
Though an issue unaddressed by the subject opinions, the reliability of many
programs, and of the tests utilized by them, have led to due process chal-
lenges."'
The impact of the legislation proposed by this Comment may best be
realized by examining its effect on the Customs Service's program. Quite
simply, the legislation would render the Service's program illegal. This
illegality would stem from three sources: the absence of both an individu-
alized suspicion and a realized harm, and the program's failure to require a
warrant after the initial collection process is completed. This finding of
illegality is a desirable result of the legislation, as it indicates programs void
of individualized suspicion or a realized harm will be found unconstitutional.
The Model Bill presented in the Appendix is an adaptation of the current
Federal Railroad Administration's regulations.21 4
V. CONCLUSION
In Skinner and Von Raab, the Supreme Court was faced with the difficult
task of facilitating this nation's war on drugs while also protecting citizens'
individual liberties. To confront this task, the Court prudently chose the
"special needs" exception to the fourth amendment to evaluate the subject
programs. Unfortunately, the Court incorrectly applied the exception by
approving programs which lacked both an individualized suspicion or a
realized harm-elements present in all previous applications of the exception.
Hence, this approval will neither end the challenges to drug-testing programs
nor preclude the institution of unconstitutional programs. To remedy this
shortcoming, it will be necessary to promulgate national legislation similar
to the Model Bill forwarded in this Appendix.
Jeffrey S. Pavlovich
283. For a case in which the parties claimed that drug testing violated due process, see Capua
v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
284. 49 C.F.R. § 219.5 (1988). The FRA promulgated the regulations pursuant to the Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 431-444 (1982).
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APPENDIX
MODEL BILL: PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DRUG TESTING PLAN
Section I
1-1. Purpose and Scope
(a) The purpose of the drug testing plan is to effectively minimize alcohol
and drug abuse in the work place and the inherent dangers accompanying
this abuse.
(b) The legislation covers all public employees in the United States. How-
ever, this bill does not preclude an individual state from promulgating drug-
testing legislation which imposes more stringent and exacting requirements.
1-2. Implied Consent
Any individual accepting public employment consents to urinalysis drug-
testing upon the employer satisfying the prerequisites imposed by this statute.
1-3. Definitions"5
As used in this bill-
(a) "Alcohol" means ethyl alcohol (ethanol). References to use or pos-
session of alcohol include use or possession of any beverage, mixture or
preparation containing ethyl alcohol.
(b) "Controlled substance" has the meaning assigned by 21 U.S.C. § 802
and includes all substances listed on schedules I through V as they may be
revised from time to time (21 CFR Parts 1301-1316).
(c) "Drug" means any substance (other than alcohol) that has known
mind or function altering effects on a human subject, specifically including
any psychoactive substance and including, but not limited to, controlled
substances.
(d) "Possess" means to have on one's person or in one's personal effects
or under one's control. However, the concept of possession as used in this
bill does not include control by virtue of presence in the employee's personal
residence.
1-4. Waiver28 6
An employee subject to the requirements of this Bill may petition for a
waiver of compliance. If this waiver is in the public interest and is consistent
285. See 49 C.F.R. § 219.5 (1988).
286. Id. § 219.7.
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with employee safety, the waiver may be granted subject to any necessary
conditions.
Section II
2-1. Prohibitions28 7
(a) No employee may report for work or remain on duty while:
(1) Under the influence of or impaired by alcohol;
(2) Having .04 percent or more alcohol in the blood; or
(3) Under the influence of or impaired by any controlled substance.
(i) Controlled substances include marijuana, narcotics, stimulants, depres-
sants, and hallucinogens.
(b) The statute's prohibitions do not extend to off-duty use of alcohol or
drugs if this use leads to no on-job impairment.
2-2. Testing Prerequisites
Before an employer may implement drug-testing, he must demonstrate one
of two criteria:
(1) an individualized suspicion that the employee to be tested was either
under the influence or impaired by alcohol or a controlled substance while
on duty; or
(2) there existed a realized harm which could be directly mitigated by the
testing of the individual employee.
2-3. Limitations
The approval of drug-testing by this statute on a finding of individualized
suspicion or of a realized harm capable of mitigation extends only to the
initial collection of the samples. Once collection is complete, a warrant is
required for chemical testing of the samples.
Section III
3-1. Test Procedures and Safeguards288
(a) All employee testing is to be conducted by an independent contractor
at an independent medical facility. Chain-of-custody rules to ensure proper
identification of samples are to be written and provided to the medical
facilities.
(b) Initially, the EMIT test is to be administered. If a positive reading
results, the GC/MS test is then administered. If this second test is positive,
the employee must be afforded the option of having the sample tested at an
independent testing facility.
287. See 49 C.F.R. § 219.101 (1988).
288. See 49 C.F.R. § 219.305 (1988).
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(c) All test results, whether positive or negative, are to be strictly confi-
dential. The results may not be revealed to other agencies, or to law
enforcement officials, without the consent of the employee.
Section IV
4-1. Disciplinary Procedures
(a) An employee providing a positive sample for the first time shall be
suspended without pay for one month and subject to mandatory testing
upon return and once every six months thereafter for two years. Employment
is continued as long as no further positive samples are provided.
(b) An employee providing a second positive sample shall be suspended
for nine months and offered entrance into a drug rehabilitation center. Upon
completion of the nine months and rehabilitation, the employee may return,
conditioned upon passing an initial test and a test every six months for three
years.
(c) An employee providing a third positive sample can be terminated from
employment with no further obligations on the employer's part.
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